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Abstract
How does the subjective conceptual framing of conflict impact the warring parties’ attitudes towards political
compromise and negotiation? To assess strategies for conflict resolution, researchers frequently try to determine the
defining dispute of a given conflict. However, involved parties often view the conflict through fundamentally distinct
lenses. Currently, researchers do not possess a clear theoretical or methodological way to conceptualize the complex-
ity of such competing frames and their effects on conflict resolution. This article addresses this gap. Using the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict as a case study, we run a series of focus groups and three surveys among Jewish citizens of Israel,
Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs), and Palestinians in the West Bank. Results reveal that three conflict frames are
prominent – material, nationalist, and religious. However, the parties to the conflict differ in their dominant
interpretation of the conflict. Jewish Israelis mostly frame the conflict as nationalist, whereas Palestinians, in both
the West Bank and Israel, frame it as religious. Moreover, these frames impact conflict attitudes: a religious frame was
associated with significantly less willingness to compromise in potential diplomatic negotiations among both Jewish
and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Interestingly, differing frames had no significant impact on the political attitudes of
West Bank Palestinians, suggesting that the daily realities of conflict there may be creating more static, militant
attitudes among that population. These results challenge the efficacy of material solutions to the conflict and
demonstrate the micro-foundations underpinning civilians’ conflict attitudes and their implications for successful
conflict resolution.
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Framing and fighting
Why does violent conflict persist? To outside parties look-
ing in at protracted conflicts around the world, the mate-
rial concerns at the core of the conflict seem fundamentally
resolvable, if difficult to implement in practice. Conversely,
to those directly involved in the conflict, differences often
appear totally irresolvable. Why are the views from the
outside and inside so different? We contend that involved
parties often view the conflict through distinct conceptual
frames from both outsiders and from each other. As a
result, they can fail to speak the same language on
everything from the origins of the conflict, to the issues
under dispute, to avenues for its possible resolution.
Attempts to categorize conflict types (Caplan, 2011;
Dowty, 2005; Tessler, 2009) in order to develop viable
conflict resolution strategies are important but may over-
look variation in perceptions among and between the
parties that could inhibit successful conflict resolution.
It is not necessarily the ‘objective’ third-party
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understanding of the conflict type that matters most, but
the way in which the groups and individuals involved
perceive the conflict. These conceptual frames can be best
understood as a way of constructing meaning (Snow &
Benford, 1988), implying that the conflict ‘reality’ is in
fact constructed – and contested – by the parties involved
(Benford & Snow, 2000). Frames are used to diagnose the
conflict (e.g. What type of conflict is this? What is at
stake? Who am I fighting?). They also entail downstream
effects on behavior, leading to different prognostic assess-
ments about the conflict (Benford & Snow, 2000).
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is an important
laboratory for evaluating the impact of these conflict
frames on political attitudes. This conflict has alterna-
tively been framed as: (1) a material conflict over scarce
natural resources in a tiny, resource-starved land (Dowty,
2005; Selby, 2003); (2) a nationalist conflict between
competing ethnic groups with distinctive nationalist
ideologies for territorially based self-determination (Gha-
nem, 2010); or (3) a budding religious war between two
religious communities (Maoz, 2014; Inbari, 2012;
Rubin, 2014). Using a combination of focus groups and
surveys of respondents in Israel and the Palestinian Ter-
ritories, we study the prevalence of these frames among
Jewish citizens of Israel, Palestinian citizens of Israel
(PCIs), and West Bank Palestinians and their impact
on willingness to compromise.
This research results in three main findings. First, Pales-
tinians and Israelis frame the conflict distinctively, even
after accounting for the potentially confounding role of
political ideology, partisanship, and religiosity. Palestinians
(in both Israel and the West Bank) view the conflict as
religious (to varying degrees), while Jews view the conflict
as nationalist. Thus, the groups frame the conflict differ-
ently from each other (nationalist vs. religious) and from
outside observers (e.g. as fundamentally identity-based
rather than material). Second, the way the conflict is
framed is significantly associated with willingness to com-
promise to resolve the conflict: those with a religious frame
are less supportive of compromise than those with a mate-
rial frame. Third, West Bank Palestinians’ attitudes toward
compromise are both more militant than their Israeli (both
Jewish and Palestinian) counterparts and more static – that
is, they are unaffected by conflict frame. This suggests that
the explanatory power of conflict frames is qualified and
contingent on real life circumstances related to the occu-
pation, such as higher levels of daily exposure to violence
and recurrent humiliating experiences.
This study adds to the conflict literature in four key
ways. First, this study complements international rela-
tions scholarship, which has identified various realpolitik
factors as determinants of the length and intractability of
protracted conflicts, by exploring the way the psycholo-
gical micro-foundations of civilian political attitudes can
stoke or ease these conflicts. Second, we also contribute
to the body of research on the complex role of belief
systems and attitudinal frames in the prevalence and
severity of violent conflict. Third, this study problema-
tizes the assumption that a conflict can be defined as one
coherent ‘type’ or that the understanding of this type is
shared by all parties. This point is highly relevant for
policymakers and practitioners, as the presence of mul-
tiple, competing conflict frames may necessitate more
complex conflict resolution strategies than the traditional
emphasis on material approaches (e.g. the distribution of
material goods and resources).
Fourth, this study adds a layer of understanding to
previous research on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. For
one, that the parties to the conflict frame it in different
ways – national on the Jewish Israeli side and religious on
the Palestinian side – implies a need to direct effort to
exploring the causes and effects of this discrepancy on
strategies for reconciliation. In addition, the finding that
Palestinians and Jews in Israel hold different frames but
are still more willing to compromise compared with
West Bank Palestinians, regardless of the frame held by
the latter, suggest that other important dynamics of the
conflict, such as its deeply asymmetric nature and
extensive exposure to violence, may broadly harden the
attitudes of the weaker population to compromise
(Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014). The distinction between
different conflict frames may thus have less of an impact
as conflict intensity increases.
Material vs. identity-based frames of conflict
Rationalist approaches to conflict rely on a variant of
realistic group conflict theory to argue that the issues
triggering political violence are material – rooted in
rational competition over scarce resources (e.g. land, oil,
water). Essentially, it is zero-sum competition over mate-
rial assets that promotes intergroup conflict (Campbell,
1965; Harvey et al., 1961). If competition over tangible
resources could somehow be eroded, the ‘side-effects’ of
the intergroup competition – prejudice and violence –
should dissipate. Using this frame, violence and conflict
are situational and will wane in the absence of disputes
over the distribution of resources. In other words, if a
material resource is contested due to its tangible value
(Carter, 2010; Goertz & Diehl, 1992), a bargaining
space should theoretically exist (Fearon, 1995). This
assumption underlies conflict resolution practitioners’
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frequent advancement of proposals that ‘expand the pie’
through incentives or formulation of equitable ‘split-the-
difference’ compromises. However, these solutions often
do not account for identity-based sources of conflict that
may be less responsive to material incentives and less
amenable to compromise.
However, parties in conflict are often fighting over
more than just material concerns. A competing theory
of intergroup conflict, social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1982), argues that material competition is not
the underlying reason for conflicts; all that is required for
conflict are distinctive group identities that trigger in-
group favoritism, out-group prejudice and violence –
even without resource competition. Even when material
conflicts are manifest, intergroup identity conflict is still
required for conflict to actually break out (Tajfel &
Turner, 1982). Identity related issues thus go beyond
the material-based core of the rational-choice model,
challenging its optimistic predictions regarding the tract-
able dissipation of conflict.
Identity-based explanations: Nationalism
and religion
Material disagreements over scarce resources are clearly
present in most political conflicts. Ethnic differences or
the presence of nationalism are generally not alone
enough to engender violent conflict. Material factors
such as poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and
the presence of large populations are often better predic-
tors for civil war onset than is the number of ethnic
groups in a country (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) or its so-
called ‘ethno-linguistic fractionalization’ (Alesina et al.,
2003). Similarly, rebels’ ability to extract resources and
recruit soldiers may be more important in explaining
civil war onset than relative repression or the presence
of ethnic dominance (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).
These accounts, however, do not explain why material
conflicts nonetheless frequently crystallize along identity
lines. Although not all wars are so-called ‘identity wars’,
those that are may stem from different causes and require
different solutions than those that are not (Sambanis,
2001). For example, land may hold symbolic signifi-
cance for conflicting parties, making the land essentially
indivisible and closing bargaining spaces that might have
otherwise existed (Goddard, 2006). This symbolic sig-
nificance can stem from either nationalist or religious
attachment to a contested resource.1
Nationalism and conflict
Nationalism has long been theorized to play a role in
exacerbating both the prevalence and severity of political
conflict. Benedict Anderson (1983: 50) describes nation-
alism as the perception of ‘a deep, horizontal comrade-
ship’ among members of the nation, even in the absence
of personal interaction. Nationalistic sentiments are thus
rooted in group identity, individual psychology, and core
human needs for attachment, community, security,
group loyalty, and prestige (Druckman, 2001).
When directed towards the political sphere, nationalist
doctrines hold that ‘the political and national unit should
be congruent’ (Gellner, 1983: 80). When this principle is
violated, and one or more populations do not have polit-
ical representation congruent with their national identity,
this can trigger conflict between groups (Cederman &
Girardin, 2007; Miller, 2005). Thus, at their core,
nationalist conflicts are over the political control of a
contested geographic space – a material issue. However,
nationalism takes this material issue and imbues it with
values rooted in group identity – this land is important
not just because of material resources, but because it is the
homeland of our people, and hence embedded with a
sacred meaning for the nation (Smith, 2000).
Nationalist conflicts can thus be seen as combining
elements of ‘instrumental rationality’ with a distinct
form of ‘value rationality’ (Varshney, 2003). Instrumen-
tal rationality represents the traditional construction of
rationality – a cost–benefit calculus designed to accom-
plish concrete goals, the pursuit of which will be aban-
doned or altered if the cost becomes too high (Varshney,
2003). However, value rationality operates differently; it
includes a conscious belief whose value is calculated
independently of its prospects for success. Values (such
as abstract ideas about ‘dignity’ or ‘self-respect’) may
allow, or even require, the embrace of very large personal
sacrifices (Varshney, 2003). These identity- and value-
based components of nationalism suggest that, compared
to material framing, nationalistic frames will be more
resistant to compromise. The value-based components
of nationalist conflicts – perceptions that a conflict is
being fought not just for land but, perhaps, for dignity
and self-determination as well – can lead individuals to
support greater costs of fighting.
1 Admittedly, national and religious conflicts do not represent an
exhaustive list of potential identity-based conflicts. Global conflicts
such as World War II or the Cold War included a strong ideological
element, for example. Nevertheless, conflicts in the modern era,
especially protracted (or intractable) ones, have emerged primarily
in relation to nationalistic or religious narratives (Brecher, 2017).
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Religion and conflict
The relationship between religion and political violence
has also been deeply contested (Canetti et al., 2010).
There is no shortage of examples of political violence
perpetrated in the name of religion and scholars have
argued that religion remains a central component of
modern political conflicts (Huntington, 1993; Juergen-
smeyer, 1993; Isaacs, 2016). However, religion is also a
primary source of empathy, compassion, and nonvio-
lence. What explains why religion can be ‘either violent
or irenic, a source of terrorism or a contributor to the rule
of law?’ (Philpott, 2007: 505). Untangling this ‘ambiva-
lence of the sacred’ (Appleby, 1999) and incorporating
religion into international relations theory is thus a cen-
tral challenge for conflict studies (Fox & Sandler, 2004).
There are three ways in which religion can affect will-
ingness to compromise on core grievances and so impact
political conflict. Compared to material, and even nation-
alist, claims religious grievances are likely to be more
deeply held (Seul, 1999), difficult to divide (Svensson,
2007), and less easily subject to trade-offs (Atran, Axelrod
& Davis, 2007).2 Religious identity and religious beliefs
are also frequently a primary identifier for individuals,
making compromise on religious issues difficult (Seul,
1999). Intangible in nature, sacred spaces – defined by
both their centrality and exclusivity in religious life – are
particularly difficult to split up because they are cohesive,
have unambiguous boundaries, and cannot be substituted
or exchanged for another good or issue (Hassner, 2009).
Importantly, the issue indivisibility of sacred, religious
spaces and values does not lie in the objective ability to
divide the space (e.g. by making Jerusalem an interna-
tional city), but in opposing sides’ subjective perception
that the issue is not divisible (e.g. the city is holy and is
ours) (Goddard, 2006). The rationalist conception of
issues as fundamentally divisible due to the multidimen-
sionality of political conflict (e.g. Fearon, 1995) is thus
less applicable to conflicts framed as religious.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Asymmetric in nature, marked by a large power imbal-
ance and a reality of inequalities, the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict is one of the world’s most deeply protracted
conflicts (Brecher, 2017). Despite mutual attempts to
engage in peacebuilding initiatives, the large number of
Israelis and Palestinians who oppose making concessions
is a crucial factor impeding policymakers’ ability to
negotiate for peace (Manekin, Grossman & Mitts, forth-
coming). It is thus vital to examine the psycho-political
mechanisms underlying public opinion in this context.3
In this study, we investigate the role played by mate-
rial, nationalist, and religious frames of the conflict in
shaping willingness to compromise for peace, at both the
group and individual levels. The Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict encompasses a significant material element – control
over territory (Vasquez & Valeriano, 2010; Rasler &
Thompson, 2006) – which is aggravated due to the
relative limitation of this resource and its importance for
another material concern: security. The disputed terri-
tory also has limited water and energy resources (Dowty,
2005; Selby, 2003). On the other hand, it can be viewed
as a nationalist conflict between two ethnic peoples striv-
ing for political self-determination. In this view, the con-
flict developed as a modern dispute between two
national movements, Jewish (as an ethnic group) and
Palestinian, which came into struggle with the emer-
gence of the Zionist movement in Europe in the mid-
19th century. Finally, the conflict can also be understood
as a deeply rooted religious dispute between Jews and
Muslims that emerged with the birth of Islam in the
7th century. In this telling, the core of the conflict is
uncompromised ownership over a sacred land that was
granted to both people by contradictory divine cove-
nants. Both parties are deeply committed to the holy
sites in the Old City of Jerusalem/Al-Quds, the division
of which is considered as the major obstacle to any future
compromise (Maoz, 2014; Inbari, 2012; Fox & Sandler,
2004). Recent empowerment of religious political dis-
course and agents, specifically the rise of Hamas (Dun-
ning, 2015; Mishal & Sela, 2006) and the prominence of
the religious settler movement in Israel (Haklai, 2007;
Rubin, 2014), also indicate the significance of this frame.
Main hypotheses
We contend that identity-based conflicts, as a category,
call for different processes of compromise and reconcilia-
tion and are less directly amenable to compromise. How-
ever, whereas nationalist frames are based in identity,
they are also inherently tied to land and territory, which
2 In this work, the authors take a broad conception of sacred values
that may also include things like ‘the nation’ or family.
3 Protracted conflicts around the world often share a number of
elements. They are usually characterized by extensive exposure of
civilians to political violence and perceived lack of resolvability,
despite international interventions. Additionally, opposing
interpretations of the conflict’s origins and attributes are a constant
source of tensions. Thus, findings from the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict have important implications for other protracted conflicts
around the world.
740 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 56(6)
may be more amenable to compromise than land framed
as a sacred religious space. We thus hypothesize a grada-
tion of the linkage between conflict framing and willing-
ness to compromise: material, nationalist, and religious
conflict framing. Namely, people who possess a material
frame will be more willing to compromise compared to
those possessing a nationalist framing, who will in turn,
be more willing to compromise compared to those pos-
sessing a religious frame.
Methods and design
We advanced a two-phase analysis – focus groups and
survey data – conducted separately among Jewish Israeli
citizens, PCIs, and Palestinian inhabitants of the West
Bank.4 Phase 1 consists of 14 focus group meetings. In
Phase 1, we (a) identified the core themes and verified the
frames respondents used as their lenses to view the con-
flict, (b) conducted discourse analysis to systematically
summarize this information, and (c) constructed a con-
ceptually validated conflict framing scale to be used in
Phase 2. Phase 2 then consists of original surveys among
411 participants in Israel and the West Bank. We used
analyses of variance and multiple regression models to (a)
identify the distinct ways in which Jewish Israelis, PCIs,
and West Bank Palestinians frame the conflict, (b) exam-
ine the impact of the different conflict frames on individ-
uals’ willingness to compromise for peace, accounting for
relevant covariates such as ideology, partisanship, and
religiosity, and (c) analyze the differential impact of these
conflict frames across the national groups.
Phase 1: Israeli and Palestinian focus groups
Focus groups are well suited to collecting data on poten-
tially sensitive information since they are less threatening
for participants than one-on-one interviews. Focus
groups are also an important tool for assessing the range
of views and representations of an issue (Morgan, 1996),
and for revealing points of contention and underlying
group dynamics (Kapiszewski, Maclean & Read, 2015).
Finally, focus groups can be particularly useful in a
mixed-methods research design as a survey pretest
(O’Brien, 1993), helping to establish the salient dimen-
sions of complex social stimuli (Lunt & Livingstone,
1996) and improve measurement validity of survey
instruments (Cyr, 2016). Merging these focus groups
with survey work thus capitalizes on the strengths of
both methods – focus groups for exploratory research
and conceptual structure and surveys to help determine
the prevalence of these attitudes among a broader pop-
ulation (Ward, Bertrand & Brown, 1991).
Methods
Because it is important that these groups be structured
such that participants feel safe to share information
(Vaughn, Schumm & Sinagub, 1996), we conducted sep-
arate focus groups for Jewish citizens of Israel, PCIs, and
Palestinians in the West Bank. The focus groups were
constructed based on the classic arrangement of six to
eight participants who had not met before, meeting in a
convenient setting for one to two hours with a member of
the research team serving as a moderator. The moderator
of each focus group spoke the group’s language (Hebrew
or Arabic) as a mother tongue, and the questions in each
group were semi-structured and almost the same (adjusted
only slightly for context), in order to avoid moderator bias.
Participants were from cities across Israel and the
West Bank, and included 32 Jewish Israelis, 42 PCIs,
and 37 West Bank Palestinians. In the West Bank sam-
ple, 83%5 of participants were men, 95% Muslim, 5%
Christian; 30% described themselves as religious, 65% as
traditional, and 5% as secular. The PCI sample was 78%
men, 86% Muslim, and 14% Christian, with 41% iden-
tifying as religious, 33% as traditional, and 26% as secu-
lar. Jewish Israelis included 69% men, with 62% of them
identifying as primarily secular, 34% as religious, and
4% as traditional.
The participants in the focus groups were first asked
to fill in a demographic background form. During the
meetings, participants were asked their opinions on the
nature of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the funda-
mental issues over which they believed Israelis and Pales-
tinians were fighting. Examples include: What does the
conflict mean to you? How do you see the Palestinian–
Israeli conflict? What are the core issues over which the
two sides are struggling? What type of conflict do you
think the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is?
The sessions were recorded and transcribed by a
member of the research team. Data were then analyzed
using content analysis and thematic discourse analysis
(Guest, Namey & Mitchell, 2012) to help identify, ana-
lyze, and report patterns or themes within the data
4 We did not conduct focus groups or surveys in the Gaza Strip due
to security considerations. Thus, we cannot speak about the extent to
which these results generalize to Palestinians residing in Gaza.
5 Gender imbalance was pronounced among Palestinians. In that
society, it is often difficult to find a large number of women to
participate in political research, given its conservative nature.
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(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Themes were identified using
qualitative assessments of ‘prevalence’ and ‘keyness’ of
words and phrases mentioned by the participants (Braun
& Clarke, 2006). A detailed overview is in Online
appendix 1 (see Table A1).
Content analysis
After identifying the core themes respondents discussed,
we conducted basic content analysis to summarize this
information quantitatively (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009).
Combining the three focus groups: 24% of participants
saw the conflict as nationalist, 27% as religious, 14% as
material and 18% as a combination of several elements,
while 17% did not have a clear answer or could not
answer the question (Figure 1).6
Overall, Jewish Israelis were most likely to possess
some type of mixed frame for viewing the conflict –
usually combining nationalist and material elements.
In contrast, for Palestinians in Israel, a religious frame
was much more prevalent. Nationalist and religious
frames occurred in relatively equal numbers in the West
Bank Palestinian context.
Moreover, the chosen frame and the issues mentioned
by the participants frequently covaried. For example,
respondents who deemed the conflict religious were
more likely to focus on religious issues in dispute (such
as the al-Aqsa mosque or Western Wall). In contrast,
those who thought of the conflict as nationalist were
more likely to mention issues like a homeland or refer
to the conflict sides as Israeli–Palestinian (Table I).
Scale construction and review
Based on the results of the focus group analysis, we
constructed a detailed conflict framing scale to be used
in Phase 2 of this research (Table II). This scale was then
reviewed by a panel of five independent regional experts
on Israeli–Palestinian issues and on protracted conflict in
general. Items were included in the final scale only if all
experts agreed that both (1) the measure was important
to the competing frames and (2) it clearly differentiated
each frame.
The focus group stage of this research produced two
key findings. First, the parties involved in the conflict
expressed three main conceptual frames through which
they viewed the conflict – religious, nationalist or mate-
rial. Second, the different parties to the conflict tended to
view the conflict through distinct frames. While Jewish
Israelis generally possessed mixed or material frames,
Palestinians in both the West Bank and Israel were much
more likely to possess a religious frame. However, these
focus groups were conducted using a non-probability
































Jews in Israel Palesnians in Israel (PCI) West Bank Palesnians
Figure 1. Prevalence of conflict frame by group (Focus groups)
Figure 1 plots the percentage of Jewish Israelis, PCIs, and West Bank Palestinians who categorize the conflict as predominantly material,
religious or national in nature in the focus groups. Respondents with mixed or unclear frames are charted separately. Note that this focus-group
sample, is non-representative, with purposive oversampling of certain segments of each population.
6 Near the end of the focus group session, each respondent was asked
‘What type of conflict is the Israeli–Palestinian conflict?’ Respondents
were grouped based on their answers to this question.
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of each population in order to ensure diversity of views in
the focus group setting. It was thus important to validate
and expand on these results and the survey instrument
using a quantitative large-N analysis, which was con-
ducted in Phase 2.
Phase 2: Conflict framing survey
Methods
In September 2013, research assistants, fluent in Hebrew
or Arabic, stopped passersby randomly on four university
campuses and asked them to complete a questionnaire
about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The Israeli partici-
pants, both Jews and Palestinians, were students at Uni-
versity of Haifa or Tel-Aviv University, while the West
Bank participants included 98 students from the Arab
American University of Jenin and 40 students from
An-Najah National University in Nablus. The sample
comprised 410 subjects, of whom 138 were West Bank
Palestinians, 124 were PCIs, and 148 were Jewish citi-
zens of Israel. The sample, overall, was approximately
58% Muslim and 35% Jewish, and 4% Christian or
Druze.7 Women made up 54% of the sample and the
average age was approximately 26. Detailed descriptive
statistics are in Online appendix 2 (Table AII).
Though the student population in this study repre-
sents a limitation to generalizability (Sears, 1986), given
the sociodemographic attributes of this population,8
recent studies have demonstrated that these samples
often produce similar trends to those found in the gen-
eral population (Altemeyer, 1996; Druckman, 2004;
Druckman & Kam, 2011; Mullinix et al., 2015). In the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the use of student samples
may also be less problematic than in contexts like the
United States because students in Israel and the West
Bank are typically older (attending either after army ser-
vice or after working for several years), therefore repre-
senting a slightly more diverse age distribution than the
stereotypical 19-year-old college sophomore.9 Moreover,
the fact that this survey was conducted with civilians
living in the midst of active conflict increases the external
validity – all students have actually experienced the
Table I. Prevalence of issue by conflict frame (Focus groups)





Religious conflict Jerusalem, Al Aqsa, Temple Mount and holy places 29% 50% 54%
Religious issues (Holy, God, God’s promise, religious faith) 59% 36% 31%
Conflict sides: Muslim vs. Jews 12% 14% 15%
National conflict Homeland, Zionism, Nationalism 33% 21% 31%
Refugees, Right of Return 11% 29% 25%
Settlements or Occupation 11% 14% 13%
Conflict sides: Arab vs. Israeli 17% 7% 6%
Sovereignty, State/Country 28% 29% 25%
Material conflict Power and control 4.5% 25% 17%
Territory 27% 25% 33%
Resources, Economy, Water 36% 25% 33%
Borders 4.5% 25% 17%
Political, Leaders 14% 0 0
Security 14% 0 0
The numbers presented here for Jewish citizens of Israel are lower than those for the other two groups because the recording device
malfunctioned for two of the four Jewish Israeli focus groups. Thus, for these two groups, only the moderators’ detailed notes were transcribed.
Word counts generated using WordCounter.net.
a Across the three groups, conflict framing was mixed for 28 respondents. For example, subjects would mention refugees and prisoners as one of
the main issues but describe the conflict as predominantly religious.
7 Five Druze respondents were dropped from the analysis because
they showed up in both the Jewish Israeli (2 respondents) and PCI
sample (3 respondents).
8 For example, our Jewish Israeli sample is 70% secular, whereas in
the broader Israeli society, secular Jews make up only 40%, according
to PEW. Because religiosity is associated with religious framing, it is
possible that other segments of the Israeli electorate (e.g. the religious
settler population) possess more of a religious frame.
9 Our Palestinian samples are younger (WB median: 21, PCI
median: 23) than the Jewish Israeli sample (median: 30), since
Jewish Israelis attend college only after army service.
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impact of conflict in their daily lives and thus can be
expected to have relevant political attitudes towards it.
Our dependent variable was assessed using items tap-
ping potential compromises for peace along dimensions
widely espoused by the international community for a
peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, such
as the principle of two states, mutual land swaps, joint
sovereignty over the holy parts of Jerusalem and
Table II. Conflict framing scale
Religious Nationalist Material
1. In your opinion, the
conflict in the Middle
East is a
1: Muslim–Jewish conflict 2: Arab–Zionist conflict 3: Conflict of resources, land, and
interests
2. For you, the issue
of Jerusalem OR
al-Quds concerns
1: The Holy City 2: The national capital of the
Jewish OR Arab people
3: The capital of an independent
Israeli OR Palestinian state
3. For you, the issue of
the land is significant
because it is
1: The Promised Land/The
‘Isra and Mi’raj’ land
2: The land of Israel OR Arab
occupied land
3: A politically and strategically
important land
4. What is your vision
for this land?
1: A state that follows
religious law (halacha OR
as part of the caliphate)
2: A Jewish OR Arab national
state
3: A state for all its citizens, regardless
of nationality or religion, as long as
it is strong
5. Who are the sides in
this conflict?
1: Muslims vs. Jews 2: Arabs vs. Zionists 3: Palestinians vs. Israelis
6. To you, the land of
Palestine OR Israel is:
1: The land of the Bible OR
Islamic property
2: The land of the Jewish OR
Arab people
3: The land of Israeli OR Palestinian
citizens
7. The one issue you
will not compromise
on is:
1: Jerusalem 2: A Jewish ethnic majority OR
the right of return
3: Defensible borders, access to
water, and territorial contiguity
8. What character
should the country
have in the future?
1: A state run according to
religion
2: A state with a nationalistic
orientation
3: A strong state, able to sustain a
high quality of life, irrespective of
its national or religious character
9. For you which is
more upsetting?
1: Surrendering the Temple
Mount and the Wailing
Wall to the Muslims OR
al-Quds to the Jews
2: The return of Palestinian
refugees OR abandoning the
return of Palestinian refugees
3: Surrendering significant territories
with vital resources and lands,
major traffic routes or water
reservoirs OR abandoning . . .
10. When, in your
opinion, will the
conflict end?
1: The conflict with the
Muslims OR Jews will not
end until Judgment Day
2: The conflict with the Arabs
OR Israelis will end when:
The state of Israel is
recognized as the nation state
of the Jewish people OR the
Palestinians get their rights
and reclaim Arab territories
3: The conflict will end when there is
an agreement dividing the
resources and territories fairly
11. The settlement
migration of Jews in
the early 20th century
was motivated by
1: Religious motives 2: National aspirations 3: Wanting to get a state with
strategic value
12. Fighting the enemy,
for you, is
1: Fighting for religion OR
Jihad
2: Protecting Judaism as my
nationality OR nationalist
struggle over Arab land
3: Fighting to preserve and develop






1: Religion 2: National interests 3: Material interests
PCIs and West Bank Palestinians were presented with the second option (e.g. ‘al Quds’ as opposed to ‘Temple Mount’ in question 9). Labels of
religious, nationalist, and material were not on the actual survey, but are presented here in order to clarify how responses were coded. Also,
please note that this scale has been translated from the original Hebrew/Arabic as closely as possible. The original instrument in Hebrew and
Arabic can be found in Online appendix 3.
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compromise on the issue of refugees (Peace Index,
2012).10 The wording for each of these questions was
adapted specifically to suit each societal context. For
example, key items were changed to reflect the relevant
society’s concerns – for Jewish Israelis the question about
holy sites talks about ‘the Temple Mount’, while for
Palestinians, it discusses ‘al-Aqsa’. We used a six-item
Likert scale from 1 to 6, with 1 representing ‘very much
against’ and 6 ‘very much support’ ( ¼ .89). The full
scale in English and in the original Hebrew and Arabic is
in Online appendix 3.
Using specific compromises is important to getting at
the concept of political compromise for a few key reasons.
First, ‘the devil is in the details’. Polls consistently show
high levels of support for peace among both Israelis and
Palestinians, yet peace requires specific compromises that
often enjoy much less popular support. In other words,
compromise is easier to support when it is vague than
when it is specific. We measure willingness to compromise
as a scale (rather than each measure individually) because
the parties would likely need to agree to all or most of
these concessions for peace to be sustainable. Agreeing to
one concession would be insufficient for conflict resolu-
tion and is thus not the core concept of interest. Second,
this measure has been developed and validated among
both Israelis and Palestinians by the Tel Aviv University
Peace Index (2012) and is common in the literature on the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict (see e.g. Halperin et al., 2011).
Third, the specific compromises embodied in this measure
reflect the broad-based international consensus on how
the contours of a peace agreement might manifest. Finally,
each question touches on core themes related to material,
nationalist, and religious frames which can be found across
conflicts. It is common for conflicts to involve issues such
as border lines, control of holy spaces, resettlements of
displaced people or refugees, and economic ties.
The main explanatory variable is our novel conflict
framing scale developed in Phase I. This scale consists
of 13 items (see Table II), designed to tap each of the
three distinct conflict frames (¼ 0.74). Each item has
three possible responses—materialist, nationalist, reli-
gious—tailored specifically for each group. For
instance, on the question on the meaning of the land,
an indication of a religious frame would be the land of
the Bible for Jewish Israeli respondents versus the land
of the Koran for Palestinian respondents.11 Likewise,
the language used in the Jewish Israeli version of the
questionnaire was Jerusalem, whereas the Palestinian
language used Al-Quds. We then formed three sub-
scales, with each respondent receiving a value between
0 and 13 for each subscale based on the number of
questions they answered corresponding to that frame.
To determine if conflict frames have an impact above
and beyond other important demographic characteris-
tics, we included covariates to account for their relative
impact on willingness to compromise. We accounted
for age, gender, education level, religiosity, and ideology
or partisanship, which are most likely to impact both
conflict frame and political attitudes.12 Exploring the
connection between these variables is important to deter-
mining the discriminant validity of the conflict frames
scale. Information on the measurement of the religiosity
and ideology/partisanship covariates is in Online appen-
dix 3.
Results
To begin, MANOVA13 pointed to significant differ-
ences between Palestinians (in both Israel and the West
Bank) and Jewish Israelis in their general framing of the
conflict (F6,810 ¼ 29.38, p < 0.001) (Table AIV in the
Online appendix). Post-hoc Scheffe tests showed that
both PCIs and West Bank Palestinians were significantly
more likely to frame the conflict as religious than were
Jewish citizens of Israel. Jewish Israelis, however, were
significantly more likely to frame the conflict as material
than West Bankers and PCIs. Jewish Israelis were also
significantly more likely to frame the conflict as nation-
alist than either West Bank Palestinians or PCIs. Inter-
estingly, compared to PCIs, West Bankers were
significantly more likely to frame the conflict as religious.
In other words, Palestinian citizens of Israel were in
between Jewish Israelis and West Bank Palestinians in
their adoption of a religious frame of the conflict.
Categorized according to their most dominant
frame, more than half (51%) of Jewish Israelis saw the
conflict as nationalist, while, in the West Bank, 64% of
Palestinians saw the conflict as having religious origins
10 https://en.idi.org.il/centers/1159/1520.
11 This reflects the findings from the focus group stage, where a
religious framing of land frequently involved land paired with a
religious indicator, such as ‘holy land’ or ‘Muslim land’, but a more
material framing of land would refer to land alongside words like
‘security’ or ‘contiguity’. These multiple meanings of land were
carefully converted into the questionnaire.
12 See for example Cohen-Zada, Margalit & Rigbi (2016) for evidence
on how religiosity impacts willingness to compromise in conflict.
13 MANOVA (multiple ANOVA) was used here because we were
interested in assessing differences between the groups on three related
continuous dependent variables (the three conflict subscales).
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(Figure 2). This demonstrates a clear dichotomy: for
Palestinians, the conflict is religious; for Jewish Israelis,
it is primarily nationalist (ANOVA tables are in Online
appendix 4).
The three groups had significantly different attitudes
toward political compromise as well (F2,401 ¼ 53.06, p <
0.001) (Figure 3).14 Namely, West Bank Palestinians
were significantly less likely to express willingness to
compromise (M ¼ 2.21 SD ¼ 1.05) than were Jewish
citizens of Israel (M ¼ 3.69 SD ¼ 1.29) or PCIs (M ¼
2.98 SD¼ 1.27). A post-hoc Scheffe test confirmed that
each group’s attitude towards compromise was signifi-
cantly different from the other two (p < 0.001).
Thus far, we established that both conflict frames and
willingness to compromise vary by national context, but
are these two related at the individual level? In other
words, do conflict frames explain differences in willingness
to compromise between individuals within a society? To
address this question, we used regression analysis across all
three parties to the conflict to examine the independent
and interactive effects of conflict frame and nationality on
willingness to compromise, accounting for gender, age,
education, religiosity, and political ideology (Model 1,
Table III). We then ran the same regression model for
each party to the conflict separately (Models 2–4).
Examining the interaction patterns and breaking
these results out by national group helps show which
group or groups espouse significantly different views
based on their conflict frame. Both Jewish and Palesti-
nian citizens of Israel are significantly less likely to sup-
port compromise when they possess a religious conflict
frame versus a national one. However, while PCIs are
significantly more supportive of compromise under a
material frame as compared to a nationalist one, Jewish
Israelis are not. Thus, for Jewish Israelis, nationalist and
material frames are comparable in their association with
support for compromise, but religious frames are dis-
tinct. Finally, for West Bank Palestinians, there is no
significant effect of any conflict frame on willingness to
compromise. This is a surprising and interesting finding.
A visual representation of the data analyzed in the regres-
sion models is helpful to illustrate the different associa-
tions between conflict frames and willingness to
compromise across the three groups (Figures 4 and 5).
This finding, that willingness to compromise is not
affected by conflict frames among Palestinians in the
West Bank, is theoretically significant. It implies that the
effect of attitudinal prisms (conflict frames) is contingent
on, and qualified by, the daily realities of occupation and
asymmetric power relations. One potential reason for the
different results may be that the overall physical and
psychological conditions of the West Bank are very dif-
ferent from those within Israel proper. One plausible
explanatory variable would be individual-level exposure
to violence and to the quotidian happenings of daily
occupation, which is much more prevalent in the West
Bank. In additional analyses presented in Online
Figure 2. Different frames of the conflict between ethnic
groups (Surveys)
Figure 2 plots the percentage of Jewish Israelis, PCIs, and West Bank
Palestinians who categorize the conflict as predominantly material,
religious or national in nature; 29 respondents who classified two
frames as dominant (e.g. indicated the same number of statements for
two different frames) are classified as mixed.
Figure 3. Impact of conflict frames on willingness to com-
promise (Surveys)
Figure 3 plots the mean levels of willingness to compromise by
dominant frame and national group on a scale 1–6 with 6 indicating a
higher willingness to compromise. Lines represent 95% confidence
intervals. Those with mixed frames are omitted.
14 See also Table AV in the Online appendix.
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appendix 5, we demonstrate that, indeed, West Bank
Palestinians are significantly more exposed to daily polit-
ical violence than both Jewish and Palestinian Citizens of
Israel (Table AVI, Online appendix) and this has an
independent, significant association with support for
compromise (Table AVII).
A large body of work has demonstrated that exposure
to violence is strongly linked to increases in militancy (see
e.g. Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009, 2013). Likewise, a recent
study (Longo, Canetti & Hite-Rubin, 2014) suggested
that daily encounters with the occupying side (e.g. when
crossing military check points, or confronted by land sei-
zure) may generate a feeling of humiliation that, in turn,
can elicit militancy and reduce willingness to compromise
for peace. These experiences are more common among
West Bankers than Israelis. The invariance across conflict
Table III. Linear regression predicting willingness to compromise (Surveys)










Gender (female¼1) –0.01 –0.19 0.32 –0.43
(0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.22)
Agea 0.40 0.60 0.10 –0.04
(0.35) (0.44) (0.85) (0.67)
Religiosity (secular¼1) –0.18 0.20 –0.70* –0.81*
(0.16) (0.21) (0.32) (0.32)
Partisanship (right¼1)b –0.87*** –1.64*** –0.23 –0.72**
(0.15) (0.23) (0.25) (0.27)
Education (BA¼1) –0.03 0.26 –0.34 –0.01
(0.16) (0.25) (0.24) (0.41)
Material framec 1.91** –0.14 0.56 1.82**
(0.63) (0.41) (0.75) (0.61)
Religious framec –0.70 –1.52* –0.37 –1.23*







Jewish X Religious frame –2.00**
(0.72)
WBPal X Religious frame 1.09
(0.59)
Jewish X Material frame –1.47
(0.76)
WBPal X Material frame –1.01
(0.93)
Constant 3.09*** 4.04*** 2.46*** 3.69***
(0.39) (0.39) (0.45) (0.56)
Observations 365 134 120 111
R-squared 0.487 0.537 0.130 0.468
The table depicts the results of a linear regression model of support for compromise (ordinal scale 1–6) based on the above covariates.
a Age normalized from 0 to 1.
b Among West Bank Palestinians partisanship represents support for Hamas, among Palestinian citizens of Israel partisanship represents
support for the Northern Front, and among Jewish citizens of Israel partisanship represents support for right-wing political parties.
c Ordinal variable of conflict frame, normalized from 0 to 1. Nationalist Conflict Frame is the omitted category.
d PCI is the omitted category. Five Druze respondents excluded from analyses.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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frames among West Bank Palestinians thus suggests that
power dynamics and exposure to violence may play an
important role in hardening attitudes toward political
compromise (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014).
The difference in the impact of conflict frame on
views about peace between West Bankers and Israeli
Palestinians is also likely tied up in the divergent paths
of these two groups since the establishment of Israel.
Palestinians in Israel are citizens of a state that is in
conflict with their kin group (Palestinians), with which
they have deep national, cultural, linguistic, and religious
ties. This conflict between state and nation may lead
Israeli Palestinians to combine two competing ideals: a
strong Palestinian identity with an equally powerful
desire for full and equal recognition as Israeli citizens
and integration in the (mostly Jewish) Israeli society
(Al-Haj, Katz & Shye, 1993). This duality, alongside
their relatively more secure and stable daily life in Israel,
likely accounts for the different impact of conflict frames
on their attitudes.
In sum, findings show that among both Jews and
Palestinians in Israel, conflict frames had a significant
effect on their willingness to compromise – those with a
material frame were significantly more likely to support
compromise,15 while a religious frame had the opposite
effect. Nationalist frames were in the middle in terms of
their impact on willingness to compromise. Regardless of
frames, West Bankers possessed a lower willingness to
compromise compared to the other groups. Additionally,
Jews and Palestinians differed in the frame they possessed;
Israeli Jews were significantly more likely to frame the
conflict as nationalist, while Palestinians (both in Israel
and the West Bank) mainly possessed a religious frame.
Implications for conflicts
People fight to protect their national ideology, religion,
or physical and economic wellness. Yet those living
through protracted conflict often possess distinct con-
ceptions of the fundamental nature and core issues of
the conflict. Religious and nationalist frames can be just
as, if not more, prevalent than material ones. This article
accounts for the effect of competing conflict frames on
the parties’ willingness to compromise. It does so by
using original focus groups and surveys among Israeli
Jews and Palestinians, as well as West Bank Palestinians.
Our findings suggest that frames of conflict are key to
understanding potential pathways to peace, and religious
framing is associated with greater militancy. In line with
research that suggests that religion pushes partisans
towards violence (Svensson, 2007; Fredman, Bastian &
Swann, 2017), this finding suggests that religious fram-
ing encourages resistance to compromise and, so, may
impede the success of long-term peaceful negotiations.
Acknowledging these diverse (often identity-based)
frames is thus imperative for building support in those
groups that find moving towards peace most challenging.
However, the lower levels of willingness to compromise
among Palestinian West Bankers, and the invariance of
their attitudes across conflict frames, suggests that the
Figures 4 and 5. Correlation between religious and material
frames and willingness to compromise across groups (Surveys)
Figures 4 and 5 plot the regression lines for Table III (Model 1)
for Jewish Israelis (solid line), West Bank Palestinians (dashed line),
and PCIs (dotted line). Religious frames (Figure 4) are significantly
associated with less willingness to compromise among Jewish Israelis
and PCIs, but not among West Bank Palestinians. Material frames
(Figure 5) are associated with significantly more willingness to com-
promise among PCIs, but not for Jewish Israelis or West Bank
Palestinians
15 Interestingly, this result was not significant for Jewish citizens of
Israel, though the effect was in the hypothesized direction.
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explanatory power of conflict frames is not all-
encompassing and is qualified by the impact of daily
realities, especially the hardships associated with pro-
longed occupation, on levels of militancy.
The debate over whether this conflict is unique or
typical is burgeoning and far from reconciled. This con-
flict has unique characteristics that may lead to questions
regarding the generalizability of results obtained from
this conflict to other conflicts around the world. How-
ever, this is a concern not just for the current study, but
for any case study (rather than cross-national) approach
to the study of conflict. While it is overly ambitious to
come up with a covering law, or general theory, based on
a single case, this study can facilitate empirically based
mid-range theories (Mjøset, 2006; Gerring, 2004) that
set the ground for comparison of conflict framing
dynamics across different conflicts.
Nonetheless, there are many factors that the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict has in common with other conflicts
around the world. For example, as with many protracted
conflicts around the world, the Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict is an asymmetrical and visible conflict between two
identity groups distinguished by culture, language, reli-
gion, and nationality. Territorial claims, historic grie-
vances, entrenched sacredness, major violence in recent
or living memory, historic injury that lives on in collec-
tive memory, and zero-sum attitudes towards claims are
also key hallmarks of this conflict. Like many other con-
flicts, the parties are deeply embedded with each other,
both physically and socially, arguably making the forma-
tion of two separate states a complex and challenging
goal. Moreover, as with other protracted conflicts (e.g.
Serbia and Kosovo, Cyprus, Northern Ireland), the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict can be classified as encom-
passing one or more conflict frames (religious, national,
and material). As such, the impact of conflict frames on
the willingness of societies in other conflicts to compro-
mise is likely also large.
Moreover, our noteworthy findings regarding the role
of conflict frames may also pertain to protracted conflicts
that have been formally resolved. For example, Northern
Ireland’s modern period of conflict started in the late
1960s and lasted more than three decades. However,
despite a formal peace accord in 1998, divisive issues
related to sectarian and national identity are still unre-
solved and contribute to occasional outbursts of disrup-
tion and violence.
This study points to individual-level outcomes as key
micro-foundations of conflict. At the theoretical level,
our work extends previous research on political attitudes
among civilians living amid political violence by
connecting conflict frames to attitudes towards peace
and compromise. Relying on psycho-political
approaches, we propose conflict frames as one key
mechanism explaining these attitudes. Our results sug-
gest that traditional approaches to conflict resolution by
third-party practitioners and scholars may err in attempt-
ing to impose one (often material) conflict frame on the
involved parties. This work thus provides a way forward
for scholars of conflict and for practitioners to approach
conflict resolution in deep protracted conflicts. Recog-
nizing the varying and often opposing frames in a con-
flict is the first step to clearing the way on the path to
peace. By extension, a successful pathway to peace must
be a sophisticated one, tailored to address the way in
which the core issues are uniquely framed by each party
involved.
Replication data
The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analy-
sis in this article, along with the Online appendix, can be
found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. All analyses
were conducted using STATA. For additional informa-
tion, contact Daphna Canetti, dcanetti@poli.haifa.ac.il.
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